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The Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial IoT 
(IIoT) is enabled by Wireless Personal Area Network 
(WPAN) devices. However, these devices increase 
vulnerability concerns of the IIoT and resultant 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) risks. Secure IIoT is 
enabled by both pre-attack security and post-attack 
forensic analysis. Radio Frequency (RF) 
Fingerprinting enables both pre- and post-attack 
security by providing serial-number level identification 
of devices through fingerprint characterization of their 
emissions. For classification and verification, research 
has shown high performance by employing the neural 
network-based Generalized Relevance Learning 
Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) classifier.  
However, GRLVQI has numerous hyperparameters 
and tuning requires AI expertise, thus some 
researchers have abandoned GRLVQI for notionally 
simpler, but less accurate, methods. Herein, we 
develop a fool-proof approach for tuning AI 
algorithms. For demonstration, Z-Wave, an insecure 
low-power/cost WPAN technology, and the GRLVQI 
classifier are considered. Results show significant 
increases in accuracy (5% for classification, 50% 
verification) over baseline methods. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The commercial internet of things (IoT) is enabled 
by low-cost and low-power Wireless Personal Area 
Network (WPAN) devices which create mesh 
networks and allow for widespread interaction and 
monitoring of smart devices [1].  Due to their abilities, 
relatively insecure WPAN devices, such as Z-Wave 
and ZigBee, find their way into Industrial IoT (IIoT) 
applications, including Critical Infrastructure (CI) uses  
[2]. Inherent vulnerabilities exist in WPAN 
technologies, see [3], which is compounded due to 
device-to-internet pathways, sensitivity of the CI 
applications, and that one compromised device can 
threaten the security of the entire network [4]. 
Robust security is of interest for both pre-attack 
defense and post-attack forensics by improving the 
ability to determine WPAN device identities. A general 
understanding of ISO layers (NWK: Network, MAC: 
Media Access Control, and PHY: Physical) and their 
relationship to security can be considered as [5]: 
1. “Something you know” (NWK – encryption keys) 
2. “Something you have” (MAC – MAC address) 
3. “Something you are” (PHY – RF Fingerprints) 
However, predominantly, WPAN security 
considers bit-level identities (MAC and NWK); thus 
ignoring intrinsic properties found at the PHY layer.   
Whether addressing pre-attack defense or post-
attack forensic analysis, the preponderance of threat 
detection and protection work in process control 
systems occurs above the PHY layer. Radio Frequency 
(RF) fingerprinting involves computing features, 
“fingerprints,” for predefined signal regions, such as 
preambles, by dividing the signal into bins and 
computing statistical features for each bin [6].  For this, 
the standard three step biometric process (library 
building, classifier model development, and 
verification) [7], is followed. Key to this are accurate 
machine learning (ML) methods. 
The Generalized Relevance Learning Vector 
Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) classifier, a 
nonlinear Artificial Neural Network (ANN) algorithm, 
has been shown to provide good discrimination ability 
for RF Fingerprinting [5]. However, GRLVQI, as with 
other ANN algorithms, has multiple hyperparameters, 
which require luck or expertise to tune effectively.  In 
general, there are “no hard-and-fast rules” in 
determining hyperparameter and their selection is part 
of the “art of [algorithm] design” [8]. Prior works in 
related areas such as feature selection, have even cited 
the complexity of the task of hyperparameter selection 
and tuning as a reason to utilize more simple ML 
algorithms [9]. In some cases - particularly in post-
attack forensics where the amount of data may be very 
large – this could limit the utility of more powerful 
computing paradigms, such as ANNs. This is further 
exacerbated by the difficulty of data collection - and 
even attribution of results - from Operational 
Technology (OT) systems in Supervisory Control and 





Data Acquisition (SCADA) and CI environments 
where specific system expertise is most likely required 
[10]. To that end, quality ML models are often hand-
crafted and require significant expertise (i.e., luck and 
talent) to appropriately train and deploy. Care is needed 
in the specification of ML models too, since an overly 
conservative learning rate results in sub-optimal 
performance preventing convergence. However, an 
overly liberal learning rate could result in highly 
oscillatory training behavior, again, with sub-optimal 
performance. Thus, to serve the pre-attack or post-
attack needs of an IIoT system, a global goal of any 
proposed technique should be to maximize the 
efficiency of the algorithm, harness the full power of 
the best available algorithms for the task, and minimize 
the expert knowledge – both in system and algorithm.  
Prior work, c.f. [5] [6], examined full factorial 
design of experiments (DoE) and hill-climbing 
approaches. However, both of these approaches had 
significant limitations. DoE methods are 
comptuationally costly and only explore limited 
regions of the operating space and while hill-climbing 
methods quickly become trapped by local optima.  An  
additional limitation is neither can handle both discrete 
and continuous variables.  Recently, Bayesian 
Optimization (BO) has been shown to be superior to 
other hyperparameter determination methods in both 
efficiency and model accuracy.  BO exploits the 
randomness inherent in stochastic processes, such as 
ANNs, and finds viable operating points.   
The contributions of our paper are as follows. This 
work compares four hyperparameter optimization 
methods for WPAN security using the GRLVQI 
algorithm as the representative classifier. The four 
methods are BO, leveraging the process of [11], 
Stochastic Approximation (SA) [6], and DoE [5]. An 
extension of CRISP-DM is used to create a repeatable 
process for this purpose using experimentally collected 
Z-Wave RF Fingerprints. We apply the four 
hyperparameter optimization methods to GRLVQI and 
aim to make the experiments as similar as possible. 
Evaluations consider both classification (1 vs N) and 
verification (1 vs 1 claimed identity) with results 
showing the BO-optimized GRLVQI outperforms past 
work by 50% in true verification rate accuracy. We 
further illustrate how BO offers better accuracy, easier 
operations than other methods, and greater 




With expansions of the IoT, the cyber attack surface 
is increasing due to the multitude of sub-internet 
pathways. Some examples are  common WPAN 
technologies such as WiFi, Z-Wave, ZigBee and 
Bluetooth devices.  This includes expansions of the 
IIoT into SCADA [12] systems and CI.  
Problematically, WPAN devices serve as the backbone 
for IoT and IIoT connectivity and these often have 
notable security deficiencies. 
Related to the WPAN devices, the industrial 
systems WPAN technologies thrust into the IIoT fall 
under the banner of OT, as noted in Section 1. Many, if 
not nearly all, OT systems in operation were desiged to 
operate, sense, or monitor an industiral process safely 
and reliably [13]. As the IoT and OT systems converge 
in the IIoT, the introduction of OT to these wireless 
networks has outpaced the inclusion of adequate 
security measures, or been unable to simply adopt a 
known cybersecurity practice [13]. Furthermore, OT 
systems often require system-by-system expertise [10].  
The expert knowledge paradigm within OT is an 
obvious drawback for any system defense framework 
or forensic analysis technique, it opens an opportunity 
for exploiting knowledge of the better known WPAN 
technologies. One such WPAN technology used in 
IIoT applications is Z-Wave. 
 
2.1.  Z-Wave Devices  
 
Z-Wave is a WPAN technology that offers both 
small and low-cost hardware devices that support many 
network topologies [14]. Practically, Z-Wave is similar 
to ZigBee and other technologies, but is simpler to 
work with [14], differences also exist in security, 
operating frequency, data rate, and latency. Primarily, 
the proprietary nature of the Z-Wave standard and lack 
of initial encyption result in Z-Wave being less secure 
than competing WPAN technologies [15]. Basic 
knowledge of Z-Wave suggests it has a similar ISO 
architecture to ZigBee due to its adherence to the ITU-
T G.9959 protocol at the PHY and MAC layers [16].  
However, as illustrated in Figure 1, details above the 
MAC layer are unknown. Therefore, to understand Z-
Wave, digital forensics, c.f. [17],  are necessary and an 
emerging area of interest [3]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Z-Wave device protocol 
characteristics, from [6]. 
 
The PHY packet structure of Z-Wave is 
conceptualized in Figure 2.  This illustrates two critical 
components of the Z-Wave protocol: the predefined 
preamble and the Start of Frame (SoF) [18].  Z-Wave 
Page 6966
is also known to include a 32-bit payload-based home 
identification and 8-bit source identification [15].      
 
Figure 2. Z-Wave signal characteristics, from [6]. 
 
2.2 RF-DNA Fingerprinting  
 
 RF Fingerprinting was implemented per the RF-
DNA (Distinct Native Attributes) fingerprinting 
process of [19].  RF-DNA is a systematic process of RF 
Fingerprinting that involves selecting an ROI to 
extract, then digital filtering, along with computating 
the instantaneous amplitude, frequency and phase, 
fingerprint generation, and finally classifier model 
development and verification testing [19]. RF-DNA 
provides biometric-like security of communication 
devices with discrimination abilities at the serial-
number level. 
 
2.2.1.  Z-Wave Signal Collection and Pre-
Classification Signal Processing.   Of interest in RF 
Fingerprinting of Z-Wave devices is exploiting the 
knowledge that the Preamble and SoF have a 
predefined and known order of 1s and 0s which should 
be the same for all Z-Wave devices.  Thus, we aim to 
discriminate between individual Z-Wave devices based 
on minute variations in the preamble signals.  
 As described in [5] [6], to create a Z-Wave 
database, three devices (ND = 3), were considered with 
each device being an Aeon Labs’ Aeotec Z-Stick S2 
transmitters. For each device, a total of 230 preamble 
responses were collected [5]. The preamble response 
(the first 8.3 ms of Z-Wave bursts) was the region of 
interest (ROI) for studying this data and thus devices 
were turned on/off to collect preamble data without 
necessarily completing package delivery [5].  
 As discussed in [5] [6], for data collection each 
device was placed 10 cm in line of sight from a 
vertically-oriented log periodic antenna (LP0410, Ettus 
Research, Santa Clara, CA). The antenna was 
connected via a Gigabit Ethernet cable directly to a 
software defined radio device RF input (USRP-2921, 
National Instruments) [5] [6].   
 Signals were collected with a sample frequency of 
fs = 2 Msps along with the bursts detected via an 
amplitude-based leading edge detector with a -6 dB 
threshold [5] [6].  The collected bursts had a native 
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) at SNRC = 24.0 dB amd 
were liked filtered [6]. To replicate more real world 
(degraded and distant) conditions, and consistent with 
[20], independent like-filtered  Additive White 
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) was applied to achieve 
operating conditions of SNR  [0 24.0] dB in 2 dB 
increments [6].   
 Due to the size of the data, i.e. only 3 devices 
considered, and the manual workload required to 
collect additional data, all devices were considered as 
serving in “authorized” roles.  Thus, impersonation 
attacks by “rogue” devices are not considered     
 
2.2.2.  Fingerprint Generation. Consistent with [20], 
RF-DNA fingerprint generation begins by computating 
the instantaneous time domain responses of amplitude 
(𝑎), phase (𝜙), and frequency (𝑓) for the  signal.  These 
responses are then divided into NR contiguous and 
equal length bins and then Ns = 3 features of variance 
(𝜎2), skewness (𝛾), and kurtosis (𝜅) are computed [19], 
[20]. As conceptualized in Figure 3, Ns features are 
computed for each bin and across the entire response 
for a total of NR + 1 features per amplitude, phase, and 
frequency response at a given SNR [19], [20]. From 
this, one considers RF regional fingerprint vectors as 
 𝑭𝑅𝑖 = [𝜎𝑅𝑖
2 , 𝛾𝑅𝑖 , 𝜅𝑅𝑖 ]1×3  , 
(1) 
where 𝑖 = 1,2,… ,𝑁𝑅 + 1, for the NS = 3 RF fingerprint 
features (statistics) [19], [20].  
 
Figure 3. RF fingerprinting concept, from [20]. 
 
From RF regional fingerprint vectors, a fingerprint 
vector for each of the responses is formed from (1) as,  
 𝑭𝐶 = [𝑭𝑅1  𝑭𝑅2 ⋯𝑭𝑅(𝑁𝑅+1) 
]
1×𝑁𝑠(𝑁𝑅+1)
  ,  (2) 
which are concatenated to form the fingerprint vector: 
 𝑭 = [𝑭
𝒂 ⋮ 𝑭𝝓 ⋮ 𝑭𝒇 ]
1×𝑁𝑠(𝑁𝑅+1)×𝑁𝐶
  .   
(3) 
Consistent with [5] [6], NR = 20 subregions 
spanning the ROI were considered for Z-Wave devices.  
Given the 230 preambles collected per Z-Wave device 
and the NR , a total of NF = 189 features (𝑎, 𝜙, and 𝑓 
responses with 𝜎2, 𝛾, and 𝜅 features) were computed 
with equal splitting of the data between training and 
testing in an interleaved manner with NTRN = 115 
Training (TNG) and NTST = 115 Testing (TST) 
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preamble observations per device. Thus, with NC = 3 
devices, our dataset has a total of NTRN = 345 and 
NTST = 345 observations, each with NF = 189 
fingerprint features. To avoid the possibility of 
overfitting, TNG and TST data were sequestered. 
 
2.3. Classifier Models 
 
Various classifiers have been applied to RF and RF-
DNA fingerprints, including Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis (MDA) [19], GRLVQI [5], and random 
forests [21].  Of interest herein is GRLVQI which has 
1) a well known trackrecord for valid RF 
Fingerprinting classification [5], but also 2) a variety of 
hyperparameters to select.  MDA is of further interest 
to provide a performance baseline.  Furthermore, both 
MDA and GRLVQI have their own performance 
advantages in RF fingerprinting problems [5] [6]. 
 
2.4.1.  GRLVQI Classifier Model. GRLVQI belongs 
to the neural network family of algorithms known as 
self-organizing ANNs [22]. GRLVQI is an extension, 
see [8], of the Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ) 
approach of Kohonen [23].  LVQ methods employ 
nearest neighbor approaches through the nearest node, 
or prototype vector (PV) in LVQ terminology, whereby 
each PV is iteratively moved to characterize the data 
through a lower dimensionality structure that captures 
the data’s characteristics [24]. Practically, LVQ 
algorithms train PVs to a given class label by moving 
correctly classified PVs closer to a given class and 
moving incorrectly classified PVs away. 
 LVQ has seen many embellishments which create 
new algorithms [25], GRLVQI is one such algorithm 
and the additional letters in the acronym signify each 
embellishment: G (generalized) for the inclusion of a 
sigmoidal cost function [26], R (relevance) for the 
incorporation of an extra loop for relevance learning 
[27], and I (improved) for improvements in PV update 
logic and operation [8]. The improvements of GRLVQI 
over GRLVQ [27] include the conscience learning of 
DeSieno [28], improved PV update logic, and a 
frequency based maximum input update strategy [8].   
When compared to the simple conceptualization of 
LVQ, GRLVQI is much more complicated.  Both 
employ a gradient descent learning rate (𝜖) to 
determine how fast the PVs move [23], and the number 
of prototype vectors (NPV) per class determine network 
size.  GRLVQI also has a  relevance learning rate (𝜉) 
to determines how quickly variables are penalized for 
being possibly insignificant [27].  Additionally, 
GRLVQI employs conscience rates (𝛾 and 𝛽) 
determine how frequently individual PVs should be 
moved [8]. Thus, GRLVQI has 5 hyperparameters to 
consider.  Additionally, GRLVQI is stochastic in 
nature, as are ANNs in general, and results may vary 
based on random selection of training data. 
 
2.4.2.  Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA).  
MDA is a linear approach to classification which 
considers an eigenvector-based projection of the data 
relative to a ratio of between-group to within-group 
sum-of-squares, known as the Fisher criterion [19].  
For RF-DNA fingerprints, MDA considers input 
fingerprint matrix F and NC  classes. Thus, MDA is 
largely intuitive in how it operates, is not stochastic, 
and it is also computationally inexpensive.  However, 
MDA can encounter difficulties with highly nonlinear 
data or when the number of features approaches, or 
exceeds, the number of observations.  For Z-Wave 
data, MDA generally underperforms GRLVQI in 
classification, but outperforms it in verification [5].    
 
2.5. Quantifying Algorithm Performance 
 
To evaluate WPAN device security, two general 
considerations exist: classification and verification. 
Classification considers “one vs. many,” and is 
evaluated using confusion matrices for classifier 
models trained at each SNR operating point [19].  
Verification is considered as a “one vs one” claimed 
identity scenario for a classifier model at a specific SNR 
with the signal compared using the classifier model and 
the associated probability mass function [5].   
 
2.5.1.  Classification Metrics. Classification 
performance is evaluated using two metrics, gain and 
Relative Accuracy Percentage (RAP), from examining 
a plot of average percent correct classification (%C) 
versus SNR [5].  
 Gain is defined as the reduction in required SNR, 
expressed in dB, for two methods to achieve the same 
%C, i.e. an arbitrary performance benchmark of %C = 
90% [5] [19]. Per [5], gain values, GSNR, is interpretted:  
1) GSNR < 0.0 (negative), a method achieves the same 
%C at a higher SNR, i.e. it underperforms. 
2) GSNR = 0.0, a given method achieves the same %C 
as the baseline at the same SNR 
3) GSNR > 0.0 (positive), a method achieves the same 
%C at a lower SNR, i.e. it outperforms. 
However, gain only considers one part of the %C vs. 
SNR curve and it might not have a value if a method 
never reaches 90%. Thus, Relative Accuracy 
Percentage (RAP) and Area Under Classification 
Curve (AUCC) were introduced in [5]. RAP values are 
the computed by finding the AUCC for perfect 
accuracy across the x-axis and then dividing 
AUCCmethod by AUCCperfect. RAP is compared with 
higher RAP indicating better overall accuracy. 
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2.5.2.  Verification Metrics. Verification, as 
described in [19], involves: 1) an unknown device 
claiming bit level credentials (e.g., MAC address) 
which match a specific authorized device, 2) extracting 
RF fingerprint features from the unknown device, and 
3) comparing new RF fingerprints against the model. 
Verification performance is evaluated using Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves at a specified 
SNR for True Verification Rate (TVR) versus False 
Reject Rate (FRR); in experimentation this is typically 
at the lowest SNR a model achieves %C = 90% [5]. 
Two metrics can be computed [5]: firstly, the 
percentage authorized (%Aut) at TVR ≥ 90% at FVR ≤ 
10%. However, %Aut is coarse and dichotomous, e.g. 
ND = 3 devices %Aut  [0, 33, 66, 100], and thus 
distinguishing between relative performance 
differences is impossible, thus we also consider the 
mean area of the ROC curves (AUCM) [5].   
 
3. Hyperparameter Optimization  
 
Hyperparameter determination is an emerging 
discipline in AI and includes a multitude of methods. 
A general taxonomy of these approaches is presented 
in [11]. These can largely be separated into model-free 
and model-based approaches [29].  
Model-free approaches can be 1) scientific, e.g. 
grid searches, or 2) haphazard, e.g. a coder 
experientially finding settings that “just work,” or 3) 
random searches which use random seeds (notably a 
competitive method). Model-based approaches 
employ a wrapper on an outer loop around the 
algorithm of interest and determine settings to explore 
in a concerted search strategy. From the families of 
model-based approaches listed in [11], we consider: 
• Stochastic Approximation [6], which is a hill 
climbing approach with hyperparameters 
individually and sequentially changed.  
Previously applied to GRLVQI in [6].    
• Bayesian optimization (BO) [30]  whereby the 
objective function is treated as a random function 
and randomly determined hyperparameters taken 
from the appropriate distribution around the 
results are found. BO tends to find reasonably 
good choices of hyperparameters, but this has not 
been rigorously studied for cyber applications yet 
The concern with all such hyperparameter 
optimization methods is finding locally optimal 
solutions, which are potentially significantly different 
from the globally optimal solutions.  Unless one 
explores all possible setting combinations, which is 
 
1 Suggested sequences are {𝑎𝑛} =
1
𝑛




often impossible, it is never possible to be certain that 
one has arrived at the globablly optimal solution.  Thus, 
the different algorithm families aim to address this 
through different strategies: replications in DoE, 
replications and embracing randomness in model-
based approaches, etc.   
 
3.1. Grid Search Approaches 
 
 A grid search involves creating a set of design point 
combinations to explore [31].  Examples include ad hoc 
approaches and factorial designs [31]. Factorial  
experiments consider  all  combinations  to understand 
significance of factors, interaction of factors, and to 
find viable operating points.  The state of the art in DoE 
includes space-saving designs which explore a 
logically chosen subset of all combinations of settings.   
 Grid searches can involve multiple steps as well.  
As described in [5], these steps can include: 
1. Initial design execution 
2. Optimal solution 
a. Spreadsheet search 
b. Response surface methods (RSMs) 
For an algorithm such as GRLVQI, there could be 243 
(35) models to create and evaluate in order to explore 
the combinations from 3 settings for each of the 5 
factors [5].  The spreadsheet search then is merely 
finding the best result from these runs [5].  The RSM 
further explores the space by considering an analysis of 
variance of the factors and their interactions and then 
by fitting a second order model to the data [5].  From 
this, new algorithm settings are computed to explore 
and, hopefully, a better result is found [5]. 
 
3.2. Stochastic Approximation 
 
A general stochastic approximation method is the 
Kiefer and Wolfowitz approach of sequential design 
[6].  Here, we will let ℎ𝑖,𝑗 be the value of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ of 𝑁 
continuous valued hyperparameter of the function of 
interest at iteration 𝑗 of an optimization procedure.  
From this, 𝒉𝑗 is a vector of these hyperparameters.  Let 
𝑓(𝒉𝑗) be the performance measure of interest of our 






𝑖=1 = ∞ , 
∑ 𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑛
∞




𝑖=1 < ∞  . 1  
(5) 
 
Using (5), let 𝒄𝑗
𝑖 = (𝟎𝑖−1, 𝑐𝑗 , 𝟎
𝑁−𝑖) where 𝟎𝑛 is a 
vector of zeroes of size 𝑛. The algorithm works as 
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follows: with 𝝉 being a termination criteria and 𝒇(𝒉𝒊) 
representing the objective function value. Also, let 
|𝒉𝒊 − 𝒉𝒊−𝟏| be the L
1 norm of 𝒉𝒊 and 𝒉𝒊−𝟏.  The 














































with one hyperparameter at a time changed. The 
algorithm terminates when the norm of the differences 
between 𝑓(𝒉) of two consective iterations is small.  In 
operation, the process changes one individual 
hyperparameter’s value at a time and looks at objective 
function results when an upper, 𝑓(𝒉𝑗 + 𝒄𝑗
1), and lower, 
𝑓(𝒉𝑗 − 𝒄𝑗
1), value of the hyperparameter is used.  
 
3.3. Bayesian Optimization (BO) 
 BO similarly considers ℎ𝑖,𝑗 and 𝒉𝑗; but additionally, 
ℎ𝑖,𝑗 is in the bounded set ℋ𝑖, which can be continuous 
or integer valued. BO notes that 𝑓(𝒉𝑗) is stochastic in 
nature due to the randomness in the results as a function 
of the random selection of training data [11]. For BO, 
let 𝑦𝑗 = 𝑓(𝒉𝑗) and  let {𝑦𝑗, ℎ𝑗}𝑗=1
𝑛
 be a sequence of 𝑦𝑗 
and ℎ𝑗 pairs.  Based on this sequence, a Gaussian 
process can be fit to 𝑓(∙), denoted by 𝐺𝑃 ({𝑦𝑗, ℎ𝑗}𝑗=1
𝑛
).  
Finally, 𝑎 (𝒉|𝐺𝑃 ({𝑦𝑗, ℎ𝑗}𝑗=1
𝑛
)) , an acquisition 
function, is maximized to find a new set of candiate 
hyperpameters.  While 𝑎(∙) can be chosen by the BO 
designer, common choices are expected improvement, 
probability of improvement, and lower confidence 
bounds [11]; expected improvement was used herein. 
 Sequentially, BO follows the following steps [11]: 
1. Obtain 𝑛0 initial evaluations of 𝑓(∙) at 
randomly selected values of hyperparameters 
within the specified hyperparameter bounds. 
Set 𝑘 = 0. 
2. Fit a Gaussian Process onto {𝑦𝑗, ℎ𝑗}𝑗=1
𝑛𝑘
, 
denoted as 𝐺𝑃 ({𝑦𝑗, ℎ𝑗}𝑗=1
𝑛𝑘
). 
3. Set 𝒉𝑗+1 = argmax
𝒉
𝑎 (𝒉|𝐺𝑃 ({𝑦𝑗, ℎ𝑗}𝑗=1
𝑛𝑘
))  
4. Evaluate 𝑦𝑗+1 = 𝑓(𝒉𝑗+1), set 𝑛𝑘 = 𝑗 + 1 and 
𝑘 = 𝑘 + 1.  If termination criteria 𝝉 is not 
met, go-to step 2. 
 
3.4. CRISP-DM+ Approach for 
Hyperparameter Optimization 
 
Approaches such as CRISP-DM, provide general 
end-to-end processes to develop ML solutions [11].  
Work in [11] extended CRISP-DM by expanding the 
Data, Modeling, and Evaluation layers to include 1) 
selecting a dataset, 2) selecting an AI algorithm, and 
then 3) automatically determining hyperparameter 
settings without expert algorithmic knowledge. 
Herein, we consider the CRISP-DM+ items of [11]: 
A1. Data Wrangling for the Z-Wave RF-DNA 
problem, this was presented in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.  
A2. Select ML Architecture this was presented in 
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 for both the GRLVQI algorithms 
and the performance metrics of interest.  
B1. Train ML Model Using Default Weights 
generally involves taking the algorithm from A2, and 
finding a starting point from either default settings or 
example settings from help documentation [11]. 
Herein, this involves baselining with known settings.  
B2. Optimize Hyperparameters involves finding 
reasonable settings via hyperparameter optimization 
methods.  Of concern is determining initial ranges for 
the weights for the hyperparameter optimization 
methods. For BO, this could include the extreme limits 
of the design space, but not for SA and grid searches.   
C. Test & Compare Optimized Model. This will 
consider the classification and verification evaluation 
methods previously described in Section 2.5.   
 
4. Experimental Results 
 
To provide a general comparison of methods, this 
work considers four different methods of 
hyperparameter optimization: 1) a grid-search using a 
full factorial design and a spreadsheet search for the 
best result (GRLVQI-SS), 2) a response surface 
method extended upon the factorial design (GRLVQI-
RSM), 3) stochastic approximation (GRLVQI-SA), 
and 4) BO (GRLVQI-BO). This is compared against 
both 5) the baseline experientially determined settings 
of [5] (GRLVQI-base), and 6) MDA. 
 
4.1. Hyperparameter Design Region 
Considerations 
 
 Although hyperparameter optimization removes 
the problems of finding initial algorithm settings, the 
new problem is determining bounds for the search 
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region for each hyperparameter. As discussed in [5], 
limited prior work on GRLVQI hyperparameters for 
any purpose, let alone RF Fingerprinting, exists. Some 
general guidelines on settings do exist, and these 
include 1) values should be non-negative (negative 
learning rates would cause PVs to deviate from 
learning goals), and 2) a general recommendation that  
0≤𝜉(𝑡)≤𝜖(𝑡)≤1 [5].  Similar guidance does not exist for 
the conscience parameters, beyond non-negativity.  
Additionally, the only general guidance on PVs is that 
too few will not capture the data well and too many will 
overfit. Capturing these guidelines, using limits outside 
previously explored conscience rates, we have the 
general search region displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. General Hyperparameter Search 




𝜖 Learning Rate [0, 1] 
𝜉 Relevance Learning Rate [0, 1] 
𝛾 Conscience Rate 1 [0, 10] 
𝛽 Conscience Rate 2 [0, 2] 
NPV 
Number of Prototype Vectors 
(PVs) per class 
[2, 28] 
 
 As seen in [5], traditional DoE need meaningful 
bounds to explore since the combination of settings 
from the extreme points of the interval are explored.  
Thus, Table 1 would be an impossibly wide interval 
with mostly unusable results (from learning rates of 0).  
Thus, the work of [5] explored values near the 
experimentally determined 𝒉𝟎 =
(0.025,0.005, 2.5, 3.5, 10) per [5].  For this, 243 (35) 
points were explored (high, centered, low).  
BO and SA operate different than the DoE.  Both 
can explore the space but do so in a different manner. 
BO will begin to model the response as a random 
process and collect seemingly random observations; 
SA will implement a hill-climbing approach and look 
for individual improvements to each hyperparameter. 
BO can explore the entire space of Table 1 and was 
allowed to do so.  SA needs a good initial operating 
point to improve upon; thus, as presented in [6], SA 
approached the problem by improving up on the 
experimentally determined 𝒉𝟎 =
(0.025,0.005, 2.5,3.5) [6].  For comparison across 
methods, the same computational “budget” of 35 
design points was given to BO and SA as well.  In SA 
much of this is spent by exploring the 4 continuous 
hyperparamters (𝜖, 𝜉, 𝛾, 𝛽) with changes of ±c as seen 
in (6). Thus, SA could only perform 31 full iterations 
(248 points) while BO could explore 243 unique points. 
In all cases, maximizing RAP was the objective and all 
algorithms were optimized for TNG set performance.  
  
Table 2. Experimental design region for 
GRLVQI from [5] 
Param. Meaning Search Interval 




[0.0005, 0.005, 0.05] 
𝛾 Conscience Rate 1 [0.5, 2.0, 4.5] 
𝛽 Conscience Rate 2 [0.15, 0.35, 0.55] 
NPV 
Number of Prototype 
Vectors (PVs) per class 
[7, 10, 13] 
 
4.2. Results  
 
Figure 4 presents the classification performance 
from the optimal from each method using the TST set 
of %C versus SNR for 1) GRLVQI-BO, 2) GRLVQI-
SA), 3) GRLVQI-RSM, 4) GRLVQI-SS, 5) GRLVQI-
base, and 6) MDA. Notably, GRLVQI outperforms 
MDA, and each optimization method providing further 
improvements with BO being the best. 
 Table 3 condenses the results and presents 
verification performance.  In Table 3, RAP values were 
Table 3. Hyperparameters optimization comparative results, performance results in bold indicate best or within 





VERIFICATION   
AT SNR = 20DB 
A B C D E 
GSNR (DB) AT 
%C = 90%   
RAP (%) TVR 
(%) 
AUCM 
TNG TST TNG TST 
GRLVQI-BO* 243 0.868 0.0014 6.881 0.392 3 +7.02 +5.89 69.21 68.57 100 0.982 
GRLVQI-SA  248† 0.078 0.016 2.527 0.319 7 +5.16 +5.05 65.33 64.79 66 0.965 
GRLVQI-SS 243 0.25 0.05 2.0 0.35 7 +5.30 +5.77 67.39 65.80 66 0.979 
GRLVQI-RSM 249 0.150 0.05 4.5 0.15 7 +5.23 +5.26 66.57 65.33 66 0.967 
GRLVQI-base N/A 0.025 0.005 2.5 0.35 10 +3.72 +3.32 62.63 61.26 33 0.936 
MDA N/A N/A +1.68 0.00 68.27 55.5 100 0.971 
*Proposed herein. 
†For 31 iteration; it should be noted that [6] also performed 10 replications per iteration 
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computed relative to perfect results and thus RAP is a 
percentages of the area under a method’s %C vs SNR 
plot.  Here we see that GRLVQI outperforms MDA and 
the baseline GRLVQI significantly with progressively 
better classification performance as one moves up the 
table. BO notably provides considerably better 
performance across all classification metrics.    
 Additionally, Table 3 includes verification 
accuracy performance of all algorithms.  Non-
intuitively, GRLVQI has generally underperformed 
MDA at verification. Prior hyperparameter 
optimization attempts, see [5] [6], improved both 
verification and classification performance, but could 
not achieve %C = 100% authorized. However, the best 
design point from BO was able to achieve %C = 100% 
while outperforming all other methods for 
classification.  Thus, the BO optimized GRLVQI offers 
considerably improved performance over baseline 
GRLVQI and MDA which was achieved with a 
reasonable computation budget. 
 
4.2. Results, Digging Deeper 
 
As seen in Table 3 and noted in [6], very different 
combinations of settings can yield acceptable results. 
Thus, it is expected that multiple local maxima exist. 
To further investigate this, we can explore the surface 
of design points and results.  Figure 5 presents this 
surface for RAP versus the learning rate and relevance 
learning rate.  Blue dots are the explored points and the 
surface is interpolated between points; the best value 
obtained by a small red X in the lower right.  Figure 5 
shows that the highest RAP values are located in 
different areas of the parameter space with the surface 
itself is surprisingly variable.   
 
 
Figure 4. Classification performance for the TST 
set on evaluated algorithms 
 
Further exploration of the hyperprameter space is 
seen in Figure 6 for RAP versus conscience rates, and 
Figure 7 for RAP versus learning rate and NPV.  These 
surfaces exhibit a similarly high variablilty and 
illustrate the difficulty in finding acceptable 
operational settings. 
Figure 8 overlays both the DoE points (red x’s) of 
Table 2 and the SA design points (black o’s) onto a 
subset of Figure 5.  The path of SA shows the 
sequential approach of this method and SA notably 
explored only a small region of the space.  Conversely, 
the DoE approach is seen to explore more of the space, 
but demonstrates an inefficiency in that many runs 
appear wasted due to the design being full factorial in 
nature.  Thus, these data suggest that a space saving 
design would be more efficient.  However, as Figure 8 
shows that both SA and DoE explored only a small 
region of Figure 5, BO has further advantages in 
exploring more of the hyperparameter space. 
 
 
Figure 5. RAP results versus learning rate and 




Figure 6. RAP results versus Conscience rate 1 




Figure 7. RAP results versus learning rate and 
PVs. GRLVQI-BO is red x (right). 
 
Figure 8. Overlay of SA (black O’s) and DoE (red 
X’s) approaches to hyperparameter optimization 




The authors presented the systematic application of 
hyperparameter optimization for WPAN device 
identification. For an application baseline, 
experimentally collected Radio Frequency (RF) 
Fingerprints for Z-Wave devices were considered.  
The GRLVQI neural network algorithm, which has 5 
tunable hyperparameters, was considered due to its 
prior successes in RF Fingerprint identification.  
However, no previously explored methods, including 
GRLVQI, achieve suitable performance consistently 
in both classification (one vs many) and verification 
(one vs one claimed identity).  To improve the 
operational security of GRLVQI for RF Fingerprinting 
applications, and other algorithms in general, we 
explored the application of four hyperparameter 
optimization methods to finding good settings.   
This work illustrated the necessity in determining 
appropriate GRLVQI algorithm settings and provided 
a further understanding of the hyperparameter and 
response relationship.  Primary contributions include 
improvements to communication device 
discrimination using RF Fingerprints by: 1) applying 
a CRISP-DM+ approach to hyperparameter 
optimization for RF Fingerprinting, 2) demonstration 
of this approach for GRLVQI optimization for Z-
Wave device discrimination, 3) improvements in the 
experimental approach of RF Fingerprinting classifier 
development, 4) an understanding of the 
hyperparameter space for complex cyber problems 
and algorithms, and 5) a comparison of 4 
hyperparameter optimization methods.  In total we 
compared Bayesian Optimization (BO), Stochastic 
Approximation (SA), Design of Experiments (DoE) 
with both a Spreadsheet Search (SS) and Response 
Surface Methodology (RSM). The systematic 
application of Bayesian Optimization (BO) was able 
to find GRLVQI algorithm settings that exceeded all 
prior bests at both classification and verification with 
100% verification accuracy achieved. The results 
further showed limitations in SA and DoE-based 
approaches which explored considerably more limited 
regions of the hyperparameter space.   
The theme of future work, in general, considers 
deeper understanding of the hyperparameter tradeoff 
space, including evaluating the robustness of these 
GRLVQI hyperparameters for other WPAN devices. 
Future work could also include combining 
methodologies, like refining initial BO solutions with 
SA, and appropriately handling variables that vary 
logarithmically, linearly, and as integers. Additionally, 
broader comparisons with other optimization methods 
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